The standard first-order reading of modality does not bind individual variables, i.e., if x is free in F (x), then x remains free in 2F (x). Accordingly, if 2 stands for 'provable in arithmetic,' ∀x2F (x) states that F (n) is provable for any given value of n = 0, 1, 2, . . .; this corresponds to a de re reading of modality. The other, de dicto meaning of 2F (x), suggesting that F (x) is derivable as a formula with a free variable x, is not directly represented by a modality, though, semantically, it could be approximated by compound constructions, e.g., 2∀xF (x).
Introduction
Let A(x) be a formula with a parameter x. Then, in the standard reading of the modality in first-order language, formula 2A(x) also has x as a parameter. In the provability interpretation of 2 1 , this reflects the reading of 2A(x) as given a natural parameter x = n, formula A(n) is provable, whereas the alternative meaning formula A(x) with a free variable x is provable does not have a direct modal representation.
We extend the first-order modal language with a construction that makes it possible. Namely, we replace the modality 2 by a family of modalities 2 X , each labeled by a finite set of individual variables X. In a formula 2 X A, the modality 2 X binds all variables in A except those in X. We call 2 X binding modalities.
In Section 2, we introduce the logic FOS4 * which is a version of first-order modal logic S4 2 in the richer language with binding modalities. In Section 3, we present the sequent calculus for FOS4
* that admits cut-elimination. In Section 4, we discuss the connections between FOS4 * and first-order S4. In Section 6, we show that the first-order logic of proofs FOLP is able to realize FOS4 * which, in combination with the results of the previous sections, yields another proof of the Realization Theorem for FOS4 and FOLP. Section 5 is devoted to the Kripke-style semantics for FOS4 * .
Modal logic with binding modalities
By X, Y , etc., we denote finite sets of individual variables. If y is an individual variable, then we will write Xy for X ∪{y}. An additional convention: notation Xy means, in part, that y ∈ X.
Definition 1 Let L
* denote the first-order modal language that contains individual variables x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , . . . , Boolean connectives, quantifiers over individual variables, predicate symbols Q n i of any arity n (i, n = 0, 1, 2, . . .), and the family of modal operators 2 X where X ranges over finite sets of individual variables.
Formulas are defined in the standard way. The only difference is in the definition of open and closed occurrences of variables: the modality 2 X binds all variables except those from X, namely,
• All occurrences of individual variables in an atomic formula are free.
• Boolean connectives preserve free and bound occurrences of variables.
• ∀x binds all occurrences of x in ∀xA and preserves free and bound occurrences of all other variables.
• Free occurrences of variables from X in A, and only they, are free in 2 X A.
The set of free variables of a formula A is denoted by FVar (A). Note also that in 2 X , variables from X are merely a syntactic label of this modality and are not considered occurrences of variables.
Definition 2 The logic FOS4
* is axiomatized by the following schemas. Here A, B are formulas, X is a set of individual variables, and y is an individual variable. A0 classical axioms of first-order logic
FOS4
* has the following inference rules:
We define derivations in FOS4 * and derivations from the hypothesis in the standard manner. In particular, in a derivation from the set of hypotheses Γ, the generalization rule may not be applied to variables that are free in Γ.
Note that each 2 X is a normal propositional modality. In particular, the following standard lemma holds:
Modality 2 ∅ , which considers all individual variables as local and admits unlimited quantification under its scope, represents de dicto modality.
The following lemma shows that the principle
(e.g., axiom A3) is derivable from the rest of FOS4 * . However, we decide to keep it in the list of FOS4 * postulates to underline the significance of this principle. Furthermore, the proof of Lemma 2 relies on transitivity axiom B2 and hence does not work for logics without transitivity, e.g., binding modalities versions of first-order logics K or T which, however, should contain A3.
Proof. The left-to-right direction.
from 5 in view of A2; 7. 2 X 2 X A → 2 X ∀xA from 6 by B1 and propositional logic;
The right-to-left direction.
A straightforward iteration of Lemma 2 yields
Lemma 3 Let A be a formula in the language FOS4 * . By A c we denote a new formula obtained from A by replacing each subformula of A of the form 2 X B by 2 X ∀y 1 . . . ∀y n B where
Cut-elimination
We define a sequent calculus for FOS4 * similar to that of the sequent calculus for FOS4 (see [7] , Section 9.1.3). In addition to structural rules (including the cut-rule), the sequential calculus for FOS4 * denoted by GFOS4 * contains the following axioms:
and logical rules:
In R∀, we suppose that x ∈ FVar (Γ, ∆). In R2, we assume that
The following connection between FOS4 * and its Gentzen-style version GFOS4 * takes place:
Proof. In order to prove left-to-right implication, reason by induction on the derivaion in GFOS4 * . The only nontrivial cases here are the modal rules R2 and L2.
For L2, by the induction hypothesis,
In order to prove right-to-left implication it suffices to show that
where A is any axiom of FOS4 * . Below are the proofs for axioms A1 and A2; axioms B1-B3 are derived similarly with the standard FOS4.
Axiom A1. If y ∈ FVar (A), then the tree below is a valid derivation in
* without using the cut-rule.
Proof. We repeat the standard proof of the cut-elimination theorem for GFOS4 by joint induction on the complexity of the cut and its rank (see [7] ). 2
Connection to first-order modal logic
In this section, we study the interconnection between FOS4 * and the standard modal logic FOS4.
Definition 3 Let A be a first-order modal formula. By A * we mean a formula of the language of FOS4 * that is obtained from A by replacing all occurrences of subformulas of A of the form 2B by 2 X B where X = FVar (B).
Definition 4 Let x be a finite string of individual variables {x 1 , . . . , x n }. By x, y we denote the concatenation of x and y. By ∀ xA and ∃ xA we mean the formulas ∀x 1 , . . . , ∀x n A and ∃x 1 , . . . , ∃x n A respectively.
Definition 5 For each FOS4
* -formula F , we define its translation to the language of FOS4, denoted by F , by induction. For atomic formulas, we stipulate F = F , commutes with Boolean connectives and quantifiers, and
where y = {y 0 , . . . , y k } = FVar (F ) \ X.
Note that FVar (A * ) = FVar A and FVar (F ) = FVar (F ).
Proof. By induction on a derivation in FOS4. For the base of induction consider axioms of FOS4.
• First-order axioms remain the same axioms.
•
, and Z = X ∪ Y ; then in FOS4 * we reason as follows.
• (2A → A) * = 2 X A * → A * for X = FVar A; as the axiom B3.
For the induction step, we note that the translation (·) * preserves Modus Ponens and the generalization rule.
In the case of the necessitation rule, 2A is derived from A in FOS4, then by the induction hypothesis FOS4 * A * ; therefore in FOS4 * 2 ∅ A * by R3; 2 X A * by A2 and Modus Ponens for X = FVar (A).
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Proof. Induction on the derivation of A in FOS4 * . For the base of induction, consider axioms of FOS4 * .
• Translation (·) * respects axioms of first-order logic.
• Axiom A1. If y ∈ FVar (A), then (2 Xy A) coincides with (2 X A) .
• Axiom A2. If y ∈ FVar (A), then (2 Xy A) coincides with (2 X A) as above. If y ∈ FVar (A), then (2 X A) = 2(∀y, yA ) and (2 Xy A) = 2(∀ yA ); it is clear that the latter formula follows from the former one.
• Axiom B1. Let y, u = {y 1 , . . . , y k , u 1 , . . . , u l } be FVar (A) \ X, and z, u = {z 1 , . . . , z m , u 1 , . . . , u l } be FVar (B) \ X, and u = {u 1 , . . . , u l } be (FVar (B)∩FVar (A))\X. Then FVar (A → B)\X is y, z, u. Therefore
which is clearly provable in FOS4 since no y i occures in B and no z i occures in A .
• Axiom B2. Let y = {y 1 , . . . , y k } be FVar (A) \ X. Since FVar (2 X A) = X, we obtain (2 X A) = 2∀ yA and (2 X 2 X A) = 22∀ yA ; therefore the translation of B2 is an instance of the transitivity axiom in S4.
• Axiom B3. (2 X A → A) = (2 yA → A ); the last formula is clearly derivable in FOS4. 
Semantics
Definition 6 An FOS4 * -model is a standard Kripke model for FOS4. Namely, a frame F = (W, R, D) for FOS4 * consists of a nonempty set of possible worlds W = ∅, a transitive reflexive accessibility relation R ⊆ W 2 , and a domain function D which assigns a nonempty set D(u) to each element u of W monotonically, i.e., uRv yields
A model M = (F, V ) is a frame F supplied with the validity function V which assigns each n-ary predicate letter P and each possible world u a subset of D(u) n (on which P is true at node u). for free variables, and each u ∈ W , we define M, u |= Aσ by induction on the complexity of A:
• if A is atomic, that is, A = P (x 1 , . . . , x n ) for a predicate letter P , then M, u |= Aσ iff (x 1 σ, . . . , x n σ) ∈ V (P, u);
• quantifiers and Boolean connectives are treated in the usual way;
• if A = 2 X B, then M, u |= Aσ iff M, v |= Bσ for each v accessible from u and each substitution σ which coincides with σ on variables from X and assigns arbitrary elements from D(v) to the remaining free variables of B.
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We say that A is valid in a model 6 Connection to the first-order logic of proofs Definition 7 (see [4] for details). The language of the first-order logic of proofs FOLP in the extension of the first-order language with a countable set of predicate symbols of any arity, without functional symbols and equality by special means to represent proofs and proof assertions, namely,
• proof variables and constants;
• functional symbols for operations on proofs: binary +, · and unary ! and gen x for each individual variable x;
• an operational symbol (·): X (·) for each finite set X of individual variables.
Proofs are representes by proof terms, constructed from proof constants and variables by means of functional symbols. Formulas are defined in the standard way with an additional clause for proof assertions:
• if t is a proof term, A is a formula, and X is a finite set of individual variales, then t: X A is a formula.
The intended semantics of t: X A is t is a proof of A with parameters X
has been made precise in [4] . In addition to axioms and rules of first-order logic, FOLP has the following axioms and rules.
• t: Xy A → t: X A, y ∈ FVar (A)
• c:A, where A is an axiom, c is a proof constant.
Definition 8 Let A be an FOS4 * -formula. By realization of a formula A, we mean a formula A r of the language of FOLP that is obtained from A by replacing all occurrences of subformulas of A of the form 2 X B by t: X B for some proof terms t. To avoid unnecessary formalism, we suggest thinking of a realization as a result of an iterated procedure which always replaces an innermost 2B by t: X B. A realization is normal if all negative occurrences of 2 are assigned proof variables.
Definition 9 The forgetful projection (·)
0 of FOLP to the language FOS4 * erases all terms in an FOLP-formula, namely, it replaces all subformulas of the form t: X B by 2 X B:
Proof. By straightforward induction on derivations in FOLP. 2
Remark 1 Note that the forgetful projection of an FOLP-formula A to the language of FOS4 (as defined in [4] ) is a superposition of the forgetful projection of A to the language of FOS4 * and the translation of FOS4 * to FOS4.
Similarly, a realization of an FOS4-formula A in FOLP is a composition of the translation * of A to FOS4
* and a realization in FOLP.
Proof. Induction on the cut-free proof in the Gentzen variant for FOS4 * similar to that in [4] . 2
Conclusions
Binding modalities system FOS4 * naturally contains both the traditional de re modality 2F , which is represented by (2F ) * i.e., 2 X F with X being the set of all free variables of F , and the de dicto modality, which is represented by 2 ∅ .
This extended set of modalities allows FOS4 * to directly express and derive new principles of modal logic. For example, FOS4 * supports the Barcan Formula for 2 ∅ : ∀x2 ∅ A → 2 ∅ ∀xA, which does not hold for the usual S4 modality rather than 2 ∅ . One could argue that FOS4 * is as expressive as traditional FOS4 since the binding modality 2 X F can be semantically encoded by 2∀ yF where 2 is the FOS4 modality and y is the list of all free variables of F that are not in X. However, such an encoding changes both formulas and derivations: for example, converting 2 ∅ A to 2∀xA renders the aforementioned Barcan Formula meaningless within the context of FOS4. In FOS4 * , however, this is a revealing and meaningful principle. We want to believe that the structural and semantic properties of the de dicto modality deserve direct study and a designated formal logic system and that FOS4 * is such a system. FOS4 * captures the de dicto modality in a coherent first-order manner, offers a natural axiom system, sequent formulation with cut-elimination, and Kripke model theory. It makes reasoning with variables in the modal context explicit and hence a subject of formal analysis which could be of interest for studies of modalities and applications.
In summary, FOS4 * can be regarded as a version of FOS4 in a refined language with an explicit mechanism of binding/unbinding variables which yet enjoys the convenient features of FOS4, such as cut-elimination and Kripke completeness.
